

## PINDAR, ARCHILOCHUS AND HIERON IN *P.* 2.52–56

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In a poem notorious for allusive obscurity few passages, perhaps, have inspired more controversy, or a greater number and variety of interpretations, than *P.* 2.52–56:

ἐμὲ δὲ χρεῶν  
φεύγειν δάκος ἄδινδον κακαγοριᾶν  
εἶδον γὰρ ἐκὰς ἔων τὰ πόλλ' ἐν ἀμαχανίᾳ  
ψογερόν 'Αρχίλοχον βαρυλόγοις ἔχθεσιν  
παινόμενον. τὸ πλουτεῖν δὲ σὺν τύχῃ  
πότμου σοφίας ἄριστον.<sup>1</sup>

The points under dispute are legion. How, for example, is the last clause to be construed and translated? Is the “wealth” denoted by τὸ πλουτεῖν literal or metaphoric? Is σοφίας “wisdom” or “poetic skill”? Does the sentiment as a whole refer to Hieron, or to Pindar, or to both simultaneously? What precisely is being said about Archilochus in lines 54–56—what, above all, does ἐν ἀμαχανίᾳ mean—and in what way does the reference explain, as γὰρ indicates it does, the preceding sentence? What, in turn, does *that* mean? Is δάκος κακαγοριᾶν active or passive in force—in other words, is Pindar saying he must avoid speaking ill of others or being ill-spoken of himself? What, finally, does any of this have to do with the solemn hymn to divine omnipotence—the “magnificat,” as it has been called<sup>2</sup>—of lines 49–52? Does the apparent abruptness of the

<sup>1</sup> The text used throughout is that of H. Maehler, *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis*, vol. I (Leipzig 1971). *P.* 2.52–56 have been repunctuated to accord with the interpretation that follows.

<sup>2</sup> By R. E. Grimm, “Pindar and the Beast,” *CP* 57 (1962) 2. Other works that will be referred to hereafter by the author’s name alone are E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1962), R. Burton, *Pindar’s Pythian Odes* (Oxford 1962), L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar*, vol. II (London 1932), C. Fennell, *Pindar: Olympian and Pythian Odes* (Cambridge 1893<sup>2</sup>), D. Gerber, “Pindar, *Pythian* 2.56,” *TAPA* 91 (1960) 100–108, B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York 1885), H. Lloyd-Jones, “Modern Interpretation of Pindar: the Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Ode,” *JHS* 93 (1973) 109–37, G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek*

transition conceal a subtle connection of thought or is it simply symptomatic of the poet's mental and emotional perturbation? The heterogeneity of critical opinion on these and similar points may, of course, attest to real obscurity on Pindar's part, whether inadvertent or deliberate, but it is also possible that the fault lies rather with the interpreters themselves, who have tended to concentrate on particularities of word and phrase at the expense of broader considerations. A sentence or sequence of sentences can usually be made to bear a number of plausible interpretations when it is scrutinized *in vacuo*; if these multiple possibilities are to be reduced to a single "most probable" reading the passage must first be restored to its larger context and viewed in the light of the intention that governs the work as a whole. Our only hope of gaining control over the perplexing particulars of *P.* 2.52–56, I believe, lies in what has been called the topology of epinician argument;<sup>3</sup> in other words, the lines must be studied as part of an encomiastic strategy defined and articulated by the conventions of the epinician genre. H. Lloyd-Jones and E. Thummer, among others, have seen the necessity of such an approach and have done much to clarify the general intent of the passage; there is, however, more to be said, particularly since their views seem to have made little headway against traditional historicism in the recent literature.<sup>4</sup>

The single most important fact to be observed about *P.* 2.52–56, and the point from which all discussion must start, is their position in the poem: standing between the story of Ixion's crime and punishment, the "myth" of the ode, and the direct praise of Hieron that occupies lines 57–67, they are patently transitional. That such a transition is imminent, moreover, has already been signaled by the word *θαυμαστός* (47) and by the reflections on the power of *θεός* (49–52), both of which, underscoring as they do the portentousness of Ixion's bizarre progeny, serve to bring the myth to a formal climax and thus prepare the way for the introduction of a new topic.<sup>5</sup> To an audience familiar with the

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*Poetry* (Baltimore and London 1979), J. Péron, "Pindare et Hiéron dans la IIe Pythique," *REG* 87 (1974) 1–15, C. A. P. Ruck and W. H. Matheson, *Pindar: Selected Odes* (Ann Arbor 1968), W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion* (Halle 1928), E. Thummer, "Die zweite pythische Ode Pindars," *RhM* 115 (1972) 293–307, E. Wyckoff, "Pindar's *Pythian* 2.52–56," *CP* 41 (1946) 160–62.

<sup>3</sup> W. J. Slater, "Doubts about Pindaric Interpretation," *CJ* 72 (1977) 195.

<sup>4</sup> Scholiastic hypotheses about court intrigue and professional rivalry are still holding strong in, for example, H. D. Rankin, "Archilochus in Pindar *Pythian* 2," *Emerita* 43 (1975) 249–55, and T. N. Gantz, "Pindar's Second Pythian: the Myth of Ixion," *Hermes* 106 (1978) 14–26. To Gantz 15, note 2, the adoption of Bundy's approach by Lloyd-Jones and Thummer is explicitly a matter for regret.

<sup>5</sup> On the "θαῦμα-motive" see Bundy 2–3 and 8–9 and Lloyd-Jones 121 and cf. *P.* 1.26, *P.* 10.48–50. The latter example is particularly *à propos* because it provides (with *θεῶν τελεσάντων*) a succinct parallel for *P.* 2.49–52. Such reflections on divine omnipotence may

conventional force of such rhetorical heightening the shift of focus effected by ἐμέ δὲ χρεών would by no means be as precipitous, unexpected, or puzzling as modern scholars have found it<sup>6</sup>—particularly since such a collocation of the first-person pronoun and a word expressive of obligation is not uncommon at points of transition where the poet is recalling himself to the terms of his *chreos*, his contractual responsibilities to the victor and/or his family.<sup>7</sup> The gist of all such *chreos*-statements is a simple “My duty is to praise”; Pindar’s innovation in *P.* 2.52–53 is to express that thought not positively but negatively, as an obligation to shun *kakagoria*.<sup>8</sup> Though usually translated “slander” in this context—a term that connotes falsity as well as malice—the word itself need signify no more than, as the antithesis of *euagoria* or *eulogia*, its etymology implies, namely “speaking ill” in the sense of “censure” or “blame.”<sup>9</sup> Now censure,

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either accompany or replace the explicit use of the word *θαῦμα* or its congeners in this *topos*; cf. Bacch. 3.56–57, *P.* 9.67–68. What these four passages have in common with one another and with *P.* 2.46–52 is that they all conclude “myths” and all are followed within a few lines by praise of the victor.

<sup>6</sup> Farnell 124 is typical in this regard: “. . . the transition from the strain of high religious poetry to this remark about himself is abrupt and rather jarring.” Those who look to the emphatic ἐμέ to establish a connection of thought with what precedes (e.g., Grimm 4, who sees “a contrast between God’s boundless power and [Pindar’s] own limited scope”; cf. also Fennell 165, Farnell 124, Wyckoff 161) fail to appreciate the conventional force of the first-person pronoun at junctures of this sort (see next note).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *O.* 1.100–103 ἐμέ δὲ . . . χρεή, *O.* 8.74–75 ἀλλ’ ἐμέ χρεή, *O.* 13.93–94 ἐμέ δ’ . . . οὐ χρεή, *P.* 9.103–5 ἐμέ δ’ οὖν τις . . . πράσσει χρέος, and see Bundy 73, E. Thummer, *Die isthmischen Gedichte*, vol. I (Heidelberg 1968) 126, Lloyd-Jones 122. On the “*chreos*-motif” generally see Schadewaldt 278, note 1, Bundy 10–11 and 53–68.

<sup>8</sup> This interpretation assumes, of course, that δάκος means “bite” and is active in force (so the scholiast, Boeckh, and the majority of recent commentators). Among the few dissenters are Wyckoff 161, M. Jean Martin, *REG* 82, 2 (1969) XXIII, and G. F. Gianotti, *Per una poetica pindarica* (Turin 1975) 36, who take δάκος as equivalent to τὸ δάκνεσθαι, and Grimm 4 (seconded by J. F. Oates, *AJP* 84 [1963] 330), who argues that δάκος in fifth-century Greek can only mean “beast”; in either case Pindar is putting himself on guard against the slanderous attacks of enemies. Against this view it must be objected not only that ἐμέ δὲ χρεών unmistakably signals a statement of the poet’s obligation *qua* laudator (see preceding note) but also that the Archilochus exemplum makes no sense if Pindar is the *victim* rather than the (ostensible) perpetrator of *kakagoria* (Farnell 126, Burton 119, C. M. Bowra, *HSCP* 48 [1937] 23). To my mind these considerations far outweigh Grimm’s lexicographical argument, which is based on the questionable assumption—questionable even when the evidence is a good deal more abundant than in the present case—that because a word bears a certain sense in some contexts it must necessarily bear that sense in all. Even if “beast” was the usual contemporary signification of δάκος, I am confident that an audience attuned to the implications of ἐμέ δὲ χρεών would have found an adequate clue to Pindar’s intention in the transparent etymological connection with δάκνω, reinforced as this is by analogous verb-noun pairs like *μανθάνω/μάθος* and *πάσχω/πάθος*. For some intriguing observations on the association of blame with biting and devouring see Nagy 225–30.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Lloyd-Jones 122. For *εὐαγορία* (*eulogia*) as “praise” cf. *I.* 1.51, *Pae.* 2.42, *O.* 5.24, *N.* 4.5, *I.* 3.3, *I.* 6.21. If in *O.* 1.53 “slanderers” seems an appropriate rendering for

like praise, may be well- or ill-deserved, and certainly if ever a man deserved it that man is Ixion; yet in order to motivate his return to Hieron as a topic of discourse Pindar pretends to have been sidetracked into a censorious vein out of keeping with the eulogistic spirit of the ode as a whole<sup>10</sup> —“pretends,” I say, because of course the *κακαγορία Ἰξίωνος* is in reality an integral part of the total design, just as the mythical “digressions” in other odes are only ostensibly irrelevant,<sup>11</sup> and because in a different rhetorical situation Pindar can speak of blame as a necessary complement to praise in his ethical mission as poet.<sup>12</sup> In fully explicit paraphrase, then, *P.* 2.52–53 might be rendered: “As a poet whose contractual and moral obligation it is to praise virtue, it behooves me to refrain from excessive<sup>13</sup> exercise of the antithetical poetic function, the castigation of baseness and vice—and so I shall say no more about Ixion.” To claim, as some have done, that not Ixion but Hieron is the target of the “evil-speaking” thus abjured<sup>14</sup> is to ignore the logic of an artfully contrived transition for which *O.* 13.93–95, the only other negative *χρή*-statement in the odes, provides an apt parallel:

ἐμὲ δ' εὐθὺν ἀκόντων  
 ἱέντα ρόμβον παρὰ σκοπὸν οὐ χρεή  
 τὰ πολλὰ βέλεα καρτύνειν χερσίν.

Here Pindar justifies his return from a mythical excursus to the business at hand (praise of the Oligaihidai) through an appeal to a principle of relevance (the tale of Bellerophon is “beside the mark,” *παρὰ σκοπὸν*), whereas in *P.* 2.52–53 he effects the same maneuver by appealing to a

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*κακαγόρους*, that is only because piety dictates that any “evil-speaking” against the gods is *ipso facto* false. If such a connotation were inherent in the compound itself we would be forced to conclude from *P.* 11.28 *κακολόγοι δὲ πολῖται* that Clytemnestra was, in Pindar’s view, the innocent victim of a smear-campaign.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. W. Christ, *Pindari Carmina* (Leipzig 1896) 131: “transitu frigido Pindarus utitur, ut a fabula de fraude Ixionis ad rem propositam et Hieronis laudem se revocet: suum esse munus in carmine encomio, ut non more Archilochi in rebus turpibus narrandis et vituperandis versetur, sed in rebus praeclare gestis praedicandis”; cf. also Fennell 165, Gildersleeve 254, Thummer 297.

<sup>11</sup> On *P.* 11.17–40, a notorious instance of alleged irrelevance, see D. Young, *Three Odes of Pindar* (Leiden 1968) 3–5.

<sup>12</sup> E.g., *N.* 8.39. On the traditional opposition between praise and blame as social and poetic functions see G. Dumézil, *Servius et la fortune; essai sur la fonction sociale de louange et de blâme et sur les éléments indo-européens du cens romain* (Paris 1943<sup>3</sup>) ch. 1, M. Detienne, *Les maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque* (Paris 1973) 18–27, Nagy 222–28, 253–64.

<sup>13</sup> Since *ἄδιδόν* means “close,” “thick,” “crowded,” “frequent” (not “strong,” “violent” as Slater and others take it), Pindar may be implying that it is persistent (“relentless” Nagy 225) censure, not censure *per se*, that must be avoided.

<sup>14</sup> So Schadewaldt 330, Ruck and Matheson 130, Lloyd-Jones 122. The distinction is of course not meaningful if, as Gantz (above, note 4) argues, Ixion is Hieron in mythical guise.

principle of encomiastic decorum; in both cases, however, the use of a *chreos*-word implies that to extend the treatment of the subsidiary theme would involve, figuratively speaking at least, a “breach of contract.”

Once *P.* 2.52–53 are recognized as an artful variant of the conventional *chreos*-statement that acknowledges, at points of transition, the poet’s duty to praise, then the rhetorical function of the *γάρ*-clause that follows becomes clear. Rather than being a mask for some personal enemy of Hieron—a rival poet, perhaps, who has slandered him to Hieron<sup>15</sup>—the Archilochus of *P.* 2.54–56 is simply the historical Archilochus himself, cited as additional justification for Pindar’s eschewing of *kakagoria* as a poetic mode.<sup>16</sup> “Standing at a distance,” he says, “I have seen censorious Archilochus, while in a state, for the most part, of resourcelessness, battenning upon hatreds bitterly expressed.” If, as many commentators hold, *ἀμαχανία* denotes the “resourcelessness” of material poverty,<sup>17</sup> then the point of the exemplum must be that a poet who uses his verses to vent personal spleen will inevitably find himself without the financial assistance of patrons. The evidence of Pindar’s usage elsewhere, however, points in a quite different direction.<sup>18</sup> *Μαχανά*, after all, is a Pindaric term for poetic ability or the efficacy of the poetic art (*P.* 8.34, *N.* 7.22), and in *Pae.* 7b.17 *ἐνμαχανία* is used in what is evidently much the same sense. The opening of *I.* 4 sheds further light:

<sup>15</sup> So Wyckoff 161, Grimm 5–8.

<sup>16</sup> So the majority of scholars, e.g., Gildersleeve 254, O. Schroeder, *Pindars Pythien* (Leipzig 1922) 362, Schadewaldt 330, Burton 119, Lloyd-Jones 122, Thummer 297.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Bowra (above, note 8) 23 and *Pindar* (Oxford 1964) 248, Gerber 107–8, Burton 120, Ruck and Matheson 131, Péron 13–14, Rankin (above, note 4) 253. According to this interpretation *ἀμαχανία* finds its antithetical counterpart in the *τὸ πλουτεῖν* of 56, though opinion is divided as to whether the wealth thus alluded to is Hieron’s or Pindar’s. On the former supposition, however, the antithesis seems pointless: what do Archilochus and Hieron have in common to justify drawing the contrast in the first place? On the latter supposition it seems in questionable taste: Pindar may refer without embarrassment to the financial aspect of his craft in contexts like *P.* 11.41–42 or *I.* 2.6–8, but are we really to suppose him capable of implying in *P.* 2.52–56 that the only reason he is not going to say terrible things about Hieron is that he knows that is no way to make money?

<sup>18</sup> Grimm 7 points out that “Pindar nowhere else uses *ἀμαχανία* in such a narrow sense” (i.e., as “poverty”); he himself follows Wyckoff 161–62 in rendering it “helplessness” and taking the phrase as a whole (*τὰ πόλλ’ ἐν ἀμαχανίᾳ*) as applying not to Archilochus but to Pindar, powerless, in his absence from Hieron’s court, against the slanders of his enemies. Gerber 101 also argues for “helplessness” over “poverty,” without, however, defining precisely how we are to understand it. To my knowledge only G. Coppola, *Introduzione a Pindaro* (Rome 1931) 144, note 1, has discerned a specifically literary signification in *ἀμαχανία*, which he translates “non poesia.” J. Péron, *RPh* 50 (1976) 69–70, recognizes that “*ἀμαχανία* et son opposé *ἐνμαχανία* désignent communément chez la lyrique la faculté qu’il a ou qu’il n’a pas de laisser parler son génie, *μαχανά*,” but he explicitly denies that such a sense is intended in *P.* 2.54.

Ἦστί μοι θεῶν ἑκατὶ μυρία παντᾶ κέλευθος,  
 ὦ Μέλισσ', εὐμαχανίαν γὰρ ἔφηνας Ἴσθμίοις,  
 ὑμετέρας ἀρετὰς ὕμνῳ διώκειν.

In praising Melissus and his clan, says Pindar, he has countless paths to choose from—and why? because Melissus himself, by winning a victory at the Isthmian games, has provided him with *eumachania*, “abundance of resources.” If poetic capability, then, may be regarded as contingent upon the discovery of suitable subject-matter, then *amachania* should logically signify the helpless immobility of a poet without such material. This indeed seems to be its sense in *P.* 9.90–92,

Αἰγίνα τε γάρ  
 φαμὶ Νίσου τ' ἐν λόφῳ τρὶς  
 δὴ πόλιν τάνδ' εὐκλείξει,  
 σιγαλὸν ἀμαχανίαν ἔργῳ φυγών.

where in the midst of a victory catalogue Pindar proclaims that Telesicrates' successes at Aegina and Megara have thrice delivered him from *sigalon amachanian*, “silent resourcelessness” or (to paraphrase more prosily) “poverty of subject-matter such as results, and inevitably must result, in speechlessness.”<sup>19</sup> Thus the point of Pindar's reference to Archilochus seems to be that a poet who, for whatever reason,<sup>20</sup> restricts his professional activity to the negative exercises of censure and blame, *psogos* and *kakagoria*, will eventually find himself afflicted by a kind of poverty of poetic resource, a sterility or barrenness of *inventio*. Whether or not Pindar seriously believed that the historical Archilochus was so obsessively preoccupied with *kakagoria* is, of course, irrelevant to his typological significance here;<sup>21</sup> Pindar's purpose is simply to throw his own rejection of *psogos* into high relief by contrasting it with another kind of poetry, unrelentingly negative in character, for which he finds in Archilochus the iambist a convenient and not entirely implausible symbol.<sup>22</sup> The contrast may well give point, moreover, to the otherwise somewhat otiose phrase ἐκὰς ἑών. Pindar is, of course, temporally distant from Archilochus by a

<sup>19</sup> So Fennell 256, H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (Munich 1962<sup>2</sup>) 569, J. Duchemin, *Pindare Pythiques III, IX, IV, V* (Paris 1967) 82, Burton 52–53 (though Burton, accepting Hermann's emendation of εὐκλείξει to εὐκλείξας, takes the phrase as applying to Telesicrates rather than to Pindar).

<sup>20</sup> Probably φθόνος; cf. *O.* 1.47–53, *P.* 11.28–29, Bacch. 3.67–68.

<sup>21</sup> The opening lines of *O.* 9 suggest that in fact he did not so believe, for there Archilochus is credited with the primitive archetype of all victory odes, the καλλίνικος hymn in honor of Herakles.

<sup>22</sup> See Nagy 243–52 on Archilochus as blame-poet *par excellence*. To Péron 14 Archilochus and Pindar embody “deux esthétiques et deux morales en complète opposition,” Archilochus himself being “le type même du σοφός qui a mal usé de sa σοφία: parce qu'il ne l'utilisé que pour satisfaire ses rancunes et assouvir son appétit de critiques” (13).

span of two centuries, but far more important is the spiritual and ethical gulf that separates the two types of poetry which, in this context, they represent.<sup>23</sup>

We come, then, to the eight simple words that have proved so problematic: τὸ πλουτεῖν δὲ σὺν τύχῃ πότμου σοφίας ἄριστον. The critical debate that this line has inspired, inconclusive as it has been in other respects, has yielded at least one important result: it has demonstrated to perfection that words taken in isolation from their context can mean nearly anything one wishes them to mean.<sup>24</sup> Of the various renderings that have been proposed some may fairly be regarded as more or less probable by reason of Greek idiom, but none, perhaps, is absolutely impossible, none—so long as the line is taken in and of itself—so perspicuously self-evident as to put the others out of contention.<sup>25</sup> Clearly the question to be asked is not “What do—or can—these words mean?” but “What *must* they mean?”—must, that is, not by grammatical necessity (grammar alone is obviously incapable of solving the problem) but by the logic of Pindar’s encomiastic strategy. His evident purpose in these five lines, let us remember, is to move from a highly critical account of a legendary arch-sinner to the praise of a great and powerful prince. His first step in effecting this transition is to announce that his encomiastic obligations—his *chreos*—forbid him to indulge in “evil-speaking” or censure; his next step is to illustrate this point *per contrarium* by the example of Archilochus, whose captious rancor, inveterately indulged, did damage to his own abilities as a poet. What third step could be more

<sup>23</sup> The majority of commentators have taken ἐκὰς ἐών as simply temporal, without explaining why Pindar should thus draw attention to the relative chronology; Wyckoff 161, followed by Grimm 6, finds no satisfactory parallel for such a sense and understands the phrase to refer to spatial distance (between Thebes and Syracuse). The idea that ἐκὰς here connotes what one might call “ethical distance” (an idea for which I am indebted to W. R. Race) may find some support in Theog. 969–70 ἔφθην αἰνήσας πρὶν σοῦ κατὰ πάντα δαῖναι / ἦθεα· νῦν δ’ ἦδη νηὺς ἄθ’ ἐκὰς διέχω. Cf. also Arch. fr. 19 West.

<sup>24</sup> See Gerber for a useful survey of the five distinct syntactical constructions that have been proposed. Since his article appeared, reading #1 (“To have wealth with destiny’s allotment of wisdom is best”) has gained among its adherents O. Werner, *Pindar: Siegesgesänge und Fragmente* (Munich 1967) 123, Rankin (above, note 4), and Gianotti (above, note 8) 102; #2 (“To have wealth of wisdom by destiny’s allotment is best”) has been defended at length by Péron; #4 (“To have wealth by the allotment of destiny is the best [part, object] of wisdom [skill]”) has been adopted, under different guises, by Burton 120, Lloyd-Jones 122, Ruck and Matheson 131, Thummer 298, note 20; and #5 (“Wealth with luck is the best [gift] of a destiny of wisdom”), of which C. del Grande is the lone proponent in Gerber’s survey, can now be found in M. Lefkowitz, *The Victory Ode* (Park Ridge 1976) 23.

<sup>25</sup> The least likely, surely, is Gildersleeve’s “Wealth, with the attainment of wisdom, is Fortune’s best” (#3 in Gerber’s catalogue), which construes σοφίας with τύχῃ and πότμου with ἄριστον chiasmatically. Significantly, this is the only reading to win no new supporters in recent years.

likely than that, having so emphatically rejected censure as inappropriate to the occasion, Pindar should then proclaim in its place what is appropriate, namely the praise of that which is truly praiseworthy?<sup>26</sup> σοφίας, on this supposition, denotes not “wisdom” in any general sense but, as so often in Pindar, the poet’s craft, and the line as a whole might be rendered: “It is wealth wielded in accordance with the dispensation of destiny that is the finest object of poetic skill.”<sup>27</sup> The poet’s art, in other words, can be put to the service of many different subjects, noble and ignoble alike, but no theme is nobler or more inspiring than the use that a great man can make of his power and prosperity—a gnomic statement that is then applied specifically to Hieron through the “pronominal cap” of 57 (τὸ δὲ σάφα νῦν ἔχεις) and developed in the fervently worded “categorical vaunt” of 58–67.<sup>28</sup> The sentiment is of course unexceptionable; praise of wealth and the εὐεργεσία that it makes possible is a common *topos* in Pindar’s odes to princes,<sup>29</sup> and the phrase σὺν τύχῃ πότμου adds the normative or ethical dimension that is, in the traditional view, required if wealth is to be a proper object of ambition or commendation.<sup>30</sup> As to the question of syntax, σοφίας is not, I believe, a partitive genitive as had been argued<sup>31</sup> but a kind of “genitive of characteristic.” In light of *N.* 10.46 μακροτέρας γὰρ ἀριθμῆσαι σχολᾶς (“to enumerate [the prizes] just mentioned is a matter for [of] longer leisure”) or *Thuc.* 1.43 τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν τέχνης ἐστίν (“the handling of ships is a matter of art” or “falls within the purview and competency of art”) τὸ πλουτεῖν σοφίας

<sup>26</sup> These three steps are set out in clear but highly abbreviated and schematic form by Thummer 297.

<sup>27</sup> Of the scholars who adopt construction #4 (see above, note 24) only Ruck and Matheson 131 and Thummer 297 interpret it along these lines; the former offer “Wealth and fortune’s gifts are themes for poetry” as a paraphrase and the latter “Das Beste der Dichtung, d.h. der beste Gegenstand der Dichtung, ist Reichtum und Erfolg.” Curiously, Gildersleeve 254, who is officially committed to construction #3, sneaks #4 in through the back-door by giving σοφίας double value in his introductory paraphrase of the ode: “Wealth paired with wisdom, under the blessing of Fortune—this is the highest theme of song.”

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Thummer 297. By this reading νῦν refers not “to the whole of line 56” (Gerber 108, note 17) but, as seems more natural, to its subject alone, τὸ πλουτεῖν σὺν τύχῃ πότμου.

<sup>29</sup> E.g., *P.* 5.1–4 (see following note), *O.* 2.53–56 and 92–100. On *euergesia* as an epicinian theme see Bundy 85–91.

<sup>30</sup> On the diction and syntax of σὺν τύχῃ πότμου see Péron 10–11; for the thought cf. *P.* 5.1–4, where wealth “imbued with pure ἀρετά” and put to the service of philanthropic enterprises (πολύφιλον ἐπέταν) is said to be “granted by destiny” (πότμου παραδόντος). E. Fraenkel (quoted by Schadewaldt 331, note 2) observes the relevance of *Solon* 13.9–13 (West), where “wealth granted by the gods” is explicitly contrasted with wealth acquired through *hubris* and injustice; cf. also *Hes. Op.* 320–26 on χρήματα θεόδοτα vs. χρήματα ἀρπακτά.

<sup>31</sup> By Gerber 106, who compares, e.g., *Bacch.* 3.22 ἄριστος ὄλβων and 3.84 κερδέων ὑπέρτατον. As Péron 7 notes, however, the parallel is inexact; σοφίας ἄριστον is not σοφίων ἀρίστη.



alone might be rendered as “the possession of wealth is a matter for (or “falls within the purview of”) poetic skill”; *ἄριστον* adds the important qualification that this is true “in pre-eminent degree.”<sup>32</sup>

When, eighteen years ago, E. L. Bundy launched his campaign against historicistic fantasy<sup>33</sup> in Pindaric criticism, he noted that the modern distaste for encomiastic poetry

leads us to prefer the irrelevancies we invent to the perfect tact of what is really there. I cannot otherwise imagine how the multitude of conventional masks and gestures that appear in the odes could have been transformed into so many personal grotesqueries, or how so many passages, perfectly lucid if one but insist that they are enkomiastic, could have become, on other assumptions, celebrated obscurities.<sup>34</sup>

P. 2.52–56 is, without a doubt, one such passage. In offering the foregoing interpretation along “Bundyan” lines I lay no claim to originality; the contribution at which I have aimed is simply a marshalling of evidence in support of views already advanced by others. The evidence here assembled shows, I believe, that the lines in question are, when regarded from the perspective of epinician convention, at once eminently lucid in the logic they display and instinct with the utmost tact.

<sup>32</sup> Thummer 298, note 20, compares such locutions as τὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας (“die Gegenstände der Philosophie”), in which the genitive has similar force.

<sup>33</sup> Notice my choice of words; Bundy of course never intended to deny that Pindar’s odes have a historical as well as a generic dimension or that that historical dimension is important to our understanding of his poetic purposes. On this much-misunderstood point see Slater (above, note 3) 193 and H. Lee, “The ‘Historical’ Bundy and Encomiastic Relevance in Pindar,” *CW* 72 (1978) 65–70.

<sup>34</sup> Bundy 35–36.